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 FIRM RELOCATION THREATS 
 
 
Motivation 
Like most states, Iowa provides tax incentives to respond to threats by existing firms to relocate.  A 
Maytag plant got an $11 million package including more than $8.6 million worth of grants and tax 
credits.  A publishing company got $10 million, and a spice packing company got $1.8 million to stay 
(Appendix B).  Increasingly, state governments are Aanteing up to keep home-grown companies from 
departing@ (Behr 1995).  States do this to demonstrate their commitment to economic development even if 
the short-run costs outweigh the benefits.  States also have to defend against other states' recruiting 
efforts.   
Tax incentive packages can cost much more than the foregone revenues from the single threatening 
firm.  Other firms are encouraged to demand similar tax breaks.  AOne consequence of the state's more 
aggressive policy has been a rush by more than 100 other [in-state] companies to seek assistance,@ said a 
business and economic development secretary (Behr 1995).  These Acopy cat@ costs greatly diminish the 
benefits of retaining threatening firms.  Copy cat costs are far too costly when a firm's relocation threat is 
a bluff.  The information that helps states avoid responding to bluffs is thus worth paying for.   
To investigate this we pose the firm relocation threat issue as a strategic game between a local 
government and a firm in an asymmetric/imperfect information context.  We assume the threatening firm 
has full information on all alternatives but the local government does not.  It is prohibitively expensive for 
a local government to unilaterally maintain firm-specific data on every possible alternative location for 
each firm in its jurisdiction.  Furthermore, even if a local government maintained such a database, it 
would not know the exact recruitment offer during a bidding war.  These information asymmetries are to 
the firm's advantage.  How much is comparable information worth to the government?  One result of our 
analysis is an indication of the value of information to a local government during a tax war.   
A different risk of offering tax breaks is that it reduces a local government's ability to provide 
adequate public services.  This aspect of the problem is also widely noted in the popular press (e.g., Wall 
Street Journal).  And, although many practical issues remain unsolved, the theoretical issues have 
received significant attention in the literature.  For a good discussion of the fundamentals about the choice 
of tax rates to compete for firms with other jurisdictions while generating sufficient revenue, see Wildasin 
(1991).  We do not attempt to retrace any of that important material here. 
We take for granted that the Atax war between the states,@ (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
1994) is in full swing, and that Aunilateral disarmament...is pretty naive,@ (Behr 1995).  We show how an 
appropriate local government strategy takes both the initial Atax incentive@ cost and the Acopy cat@ tax 
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incentive costs into account.  Our paper is in the spirit of Oechssler (1994), AThe City vs. Firm Subsidy 
Game."  Oechssler assumes that a firm signals its threat by undertaking costly lobbying.  The city may 
choose to incur the cost of an audit to determine the credibility of the firm's threat.  Our approach is less 
complicated because we abstract from signaling and auditing and focus on the potentially more costly 
copy cat costs instead. 
We assume that a firm's demand for lower taxes may be merely a bluff.  Firms have incentives to 
play this game in the midst of the tax war between the states.  In contrast to Oechssler's assumptions, 
firms have little (if anything at all) to lose.  This is because firms in the real world need not lobby when 
governments actively prey on each other's industrial bases.  When states assume the costs of recruiting 
(see Isserman 1994), the firms cost of signaling a relocation threat reduces to zero.  Any firm can bluff.  
But a government cannot afford to treat all threats as bluffs.  The government must weigh the possible 
consequences of keeping the firm at reduced direct and indirect tax revenues against losing the firm and 
all associated revenues outright. 
 
The Model 
Our story begins when a firm approaches a local government's economic development officer.  The 
firm's representative says: 
AOur firm has been recruited by another government.  The other government will even pay 
our relocation costs.  We want to give this city an opportunity to retain us.  If you can offer a 
package that makes it economically desirable to stay, we will stay.  However, we are prepared to 
move if you do not help our firm.@ 
The local government's objective is to get re-elected.  It realizes that it must, at least in the short run, 
provide public services at or above some minimum level and that at least a minimum amount of tax 
revenues must be collected from citizens and firms.  We assume that these are non-rival public goods, so 
that the same level of public goods is needed with or without the threatening firm.  If expected total tax 
revenues (if the firm stays) exceed the required level net of incentive costs, the government can respond 
with little to lose.  This process may be healthy; it can squeeze the fat out of a government budget.  More 
likely, the expected total revenues with a successful retention are lower than the required minimum level. 
In the later situation the value of being able to distinguish a bluff from a credible threat is much 
larger.  The marginal value of an additional dollar of tax revenue rises as the minimum finance 
requirement constraint tightens.  Once a battle in the tax war begins, the local government can not 
increase its revenues; it can merely attempt to minimize the losses.  The government's optimal strategy is 
chosen to minimize revenue losses due to the firm's relocation or from incentives granted to the original 
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supplicant and the copy cats.  This is consistent with the relatively short sighted view of many elected 
officials.    
The firm's objective is to maximize profit.  To focus on the role of taxes, we assume that the firm's 
output, prices and production costs (including rents, wages, and transport costs) are the same everywhere.  
Given that the recruitment package includes relocation costs, the only difference between locations is 
taxes.  To maximize profits, the firm can attempt a bluff to lower its tax liability in its current location, or, 
if recruited, choose whichever location extracts the lowest taxes. 
The firm and the government are the two basic players in this strategic game.  The game is defined 
by (1) the choices available to the players, (2) the information available to the players, (3) the sequence of 
moves, and (4) the outcomes or payoffs.  The payoff for the local government is summarized by the 
change in its total tax revenue relative to the status quo.  The payoff for the firm is summarized by the 
change in its individual tax liability relative to the status quo.  We employ the following notation to define 
these elements explicitly. 
The local government's tax revenue (π) consists of tax revenues from other firms (τ), tax revenue 
from the threatening firm at the original level (To) plus indirect tax revenues due to the firm operating in 
the jurisdiction (I).  Indirect tax revenues include the income, property and sales taxes paid by employees 
of the firm, plus other tax revenues on economic activity associated with the firm's operations in the 
location. 
 
(1) π = τ + To + I  
 
Giving a tax incentive to the threatening firm may encourage other firms to follow the same process.  
We call this Acopy cat@ behavior.  Other firms will see an opportunity to get a piece of the Atax incentive 
pie.@   They could invite a recruitment offer, attempt a bluff, or simply demand the same tax relief.  Thus, 
retaining the threatening firm, through an incentive package, leads to lower total revenues as π drops by 
the change in the tax levy (To ! Tr) to Tr, and τ drops to by the copy cat costs, C, to (τ ! C): 
(2) πr =  (τ ! C) + Tr + I 
 
If the government does not respond and loses the firm, its revenues drop to τ: 
 
(2´) πo' =  τ . 
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If the government acquiesces and the firm chooses to relocate, the government loses the threatening 
firm's direct and indirect revenues, plus, copy cat costs: 
 
(2´´) πr' =  (τ ! C) 
 
Clearly, this third outcome is the worst, and the government would be willing to pay at least the 
difference between (2´´) and (2´), which is C, to avoid it.  Even in the best case, the government that 
responds loses direct tax revenue plus copy cat revenues, [(To ! Tr) + C].  Thus, C represents a lower 
bound on what a government stands to lose by inadvertently responding to a bluff.  It could be estimated 
as the tax break rate per Afootloose@ firm. 
Each player has a single strategic alternative.  Upon hearing the threat, the local government must 
decide to continue with the original tax (O) or to provide a relief tax package, (R).  Similarly, after 
making the threat the firm must decide to stay (S) or move (M).  The firm's informational advantage over 
the government, however, is twofold.  One, only the firm knows if it is bluffing.  Two, the firm does not 
have to decide to stay or move until it also knows the local government's response.  The government 
knows neither the credibility of the threat nor whether its offer will be sufficient to retain the firm. 
Implicitly there is another player in this game, the hypothetical other government.  Either it or the 
threatening firm takes an initial move: the other government recruits, or, the firm bluffs.  The local 
government does not know which may have happened.   It may know that other costs and revenues are the 
same elsewhere, but it can not tell if the firm has been recruited and has a credible threat or if it is 
bluffing. 
When a player is uncertain about the outcome of a previous move, the game is referred to as a game 
of incomplete information.  As explained by Fudenberg and Tirole (1993, p.209), Harsanyi showed how 
to convert games of incomplete information into a game of imperfect information by referring to the 
probabilities of outcomes.  The information available to the local government can be characterized in 
some degree of uncertainty about the ranking of their tax offer relative to the hypothetical recruiting 
government's offer (Tz).    
We apply this as follows.  The local government assigns subjective probabilities P1, P2, and P3 to the 
possible states of nature:  
 
Pr(Tz < Tr)   = P1  
 
Pr(Tr # Tz < To)  = P2  
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Pr(To # Tz)  = P3  
 
where 0 # P1, P2, P3 # 1,  and,  (P1 + P2 + P3) = 1. 
P1 is the probability that the firm actually has a tax package/location offer that the current local 
government cannot beat.  P2 is the probability that the firm is not bluffing, and, there is a relief tax 
package that the firm could accept and stay.  P3 is the probability the firm is bluffing. 
Of course, only one of these rankings will be observed after all the information is revealed.  The 
point of assigning probabilities is to make explicit that typically the local government does not know 
which ranking is correct.  The interaction between the firm and the government mimics a sealed bid 
auction where local governments bid against each other for the location of the firm.   
To highlight the value of information, we consider four possible cases.  
Case 1:  Perfect Information.  The local government knows the other locations' tax offer and 
therefore the relative rankings of To, Tr, and Tz.  Thus,  Pi=1  and  P-i=0 ;  for any i = 1,2,3 . 
Case 2:  It Depends.  The local government knows that they can offer a relief package at least as low 
as another government.  Recall that no government can reduce tax revenues so low that it cannot 
cover minimum costs of public good service delivery.  This constraint may put a lower bound on Tr 
offered at any location.  In this case, Tz $ Tr and not Tz < Tr; so  P1 = 0. 
Case 3:  No Bluff.  The local government knows that the other government can beat their original 
tax, i.e., Tz < To; and thus P3 = 0. 
Case 4:  Clueless.  The local government has no information about the hypothetical other 
government's tax offer. 
The tree or extensive form of the game allows us to depict the information set of the local 
government, the sequence of moves, and the probabilities of the tax package rankings.  Each node 
represents a player and their possible moves.  By reading Figure 1 from left to right we see how the 
different states of nature lead to different payoffs by following the sequence of moves.  First, the tax 
package of the hypothetical other government, Tz, is announced by the threatening firm.  There are three 
possible relative rankings for the tax package Tz, as described above.  Next, the local government chooses 
the original (O) or a relief tax (R).  The final move is the firm's decision to stay (S) or move (M).   
After both the government and the firm have made their strategic choice, the payoffs to each are 
revealed.  The payoff at the end of each branch of the tree corresponds to a state of nature and a unique 
sequence of choices made by each player relative to the status quo.  For example, consider the situation in 
which Tz < Tr, the top branch.  If the government does not flinch and maintains the status quo (O) and the 
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firm stays (S), there is no net payoff or loss.  If the firm moves away (M) in order to gain the tax 
differential (To ! Tz), the local government loses the direct and indirect tax revenues (To + I). 
The basic tree in Figure 1 can be adapted to differentiate the cases according to various mixes of 
information available to each player.  The information set at any stage of the game can be shown by 
enclosing areas around nodes that are not known with certainty.  If only P1 = 0 is known with certainty, 
nodes 2B and 2C have strictly positive probabilities, so they would be encircled by dashed lines.  If only 
P3 = 0 is known (i.e. case 3), nodes 2A and 2B are encircled because the government does not know 
which one is the true state of nature.  If the government is Aclueless,@ all three nodes of the second stage 
are encircled. 
The optimal choices can be determined through backward induction.  Since the firm moves last and 
has full information, its move is deterministic rather than stochastic and will determine the payoffs.  The 
profit maximizing firm picks the best tax deal relative to the status quo.  In all cases, tax relief is better for 
the firm than the original tax;  Tr < To, so (To ! Tr) is always positive.  The payoffs corresponding to the 
strategies that the firm will pick under each state of nature are bold.   
Next, note the payoff to the other player (the government) at the firms optimally chosen branch.  
Recall that the local government's payoffs are also relative to the status quo.  The government's general 
decision rule is to offer relief if the expected tax revenues from offering relief are at least as large as 
expected revenues of maintaining the original tax rates.  Choose R iff 
 
(3) E[R] $ E[O] . 
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Figure 1.  The firm relocation threat game tree with copy cat costs 
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When there is Perfect Information (Case 1), there are three subcases.  Each subcase corresponds to 
one of the three probability rankings of tax packages.  Recall that with perfect information, both the firm 
and the government know everything.  The local government knows with certainty the alternative tax 
package (or the bluff).  Subcases A and C are clear cut.  The government should never offer relief, and the 
firm always moves in subcase A and always stays in subcase C.  Subcase B is the interesting one, because 
the firm's optimal strategies depend on what the government does.  
Subcase A is a hopeless cause.  When Tz < Tr the firm's payoff is highest when it moves, no matter 
what the local government does.  The government can not beat the other offer and it knows it.  
Furthermore, if the government offers relief it would not only lose the direct and indirect revenues, but it 
would also lose copy cat costs.  The firm will move and the government should maintain their original tax 
package.  
Subcase C is the bluff.  When To # Tz, the other tax offer is either larger than the original tax liability 
of the firm or the firm is simply bluffing and has no better offer.  The firm will stay at the current location 
no matter what the local government does.  So the local government should not offer any relief. 
Subcase B is the mixed bag.  The firm will profit by moving if original taxes are maintained, but it 
profits by staying if relief is offered.  The local government should only offer relief if the expected payoff 
from relief is at least as large as the expected payoff of their original tax strategy.  Comparing the two 
payoffs to the government, this reduces to the basic decision rule:  Choose relief iff 
 
(4)  Tr+I  $  C . 
 
The local government should offer tax relief when the direct revenues plus the indirect tax revenue due to 
the firm, even after relief, at least exceed copy cat costs. 
Now consider the imperfect information cases 2, 3, and 4.  Figure 2 focuses on the game one step 
back from the final step.  This step is the government's move, given that the firm's decision has been 
determined.  In each of these cases the government does not know which is the true state of nature.  The 
optimal decision for the local government is to minimize its losses given the optimal choice of the firm. In 
cases 2, 3, and 4 of imperfect information, the government's expected payoffs are the probability-
weighted revenue losses.  The solutions to each case follow.   
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Figure 2.  The firm’s relocation threat game tree, one step back 
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In Case 2, It Depends.  The local government can eliminate the possibility that another government 
could under-bid their relief offer.  Since the local government can eliminate only one set of outcomes, 
there remains uncertainty about the other two possibilities.  Thus, in case 2CP1 is zeroCthe first set of 
outcomes have no weight:   
 
(5) E[R] = - { P2[(To-Tr)+C)] + P3[(To-Tr)+C)]} = -[(To-Tr)+C)] , 
 
(6) E[O] = P3(0) - P2(To+I) = -P2(To+I) , 
 
(7) E[R] $ E[O]  iff  [(To-Tr)+C)] # P2(To+I) . 
 
The government should offer relief if and only if the inequality in (7) holds.  This inequality can be 
expressed another way to highlight the probability P2.  If this subjective probability is greater than the rate 
of change of tax revenues then it would be optimal to offer relief.  That is, offer relief if: 
 
(7´) [(To-Tr)+C)]/(To+I)  # P2  
 
The smaller the tax revenue losses of offering relief are relative to the status quo firm-related revenues, 
the more likely relief can be optimally chosen.  By the same token, the more likely that relief is an 
optimal strategy (P2 higher), the larger rate of revenue loss the government is willing to  accept.  This 
criterion shows that rational governments optimally provide tax relief that may be quite costly.   
Case 3 is the No Bluff case, in which the local government can only rule out the possibility of a bluff.   
The firm may have an opportunity to accept a tax package being smaller than the original tax package.  
The probabilities P1 and P2 cannot be given the value of zero since the government does not know the 
true state of nature, 2A or 2B.  As before, weight the outcomes to find the expected values of each 
strategy: 
 
(8)  E[R] = - { P1(To+I+C) + P2[(To-Tr)+C] }   
 
(9)  E[O] = - { P1(To+I) + P2(To+I)} = - (To + I) . 
 
The decision rule in this case is another version of the basic rule, (4).  Choose relief iff: 
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(10) C # (1-P1)(I) + P2(Tr) . 
 
Since P3 = 0, (1-P1) = P2, so 
 
(10´) C #  P2(Tr + I) . 
 
This decision rule highlights the role of copy cat costs.  As before, if they are expected to be high, relief is 
not likely to be optimal.  The right hand side is something less than the direct plus indirect tax revenues.  
This is the upper bound for copy cat costs, above which a government should never offer relief.   
Finally, consider the Clueless case of no information, Case 4.  The government has no idea how its 
tax package compares with others.  Given its subjective probabilities about the possible ranking of their 
own tax package relative to possible alternatives, we assume this government will still offer relief when 
relief gives the highest expected payoff.  The probability-weighted payoffs are:  
 
(11) E[R] = P1[-{To+C+I}] + P2[-{(To-Tr)+C}] + P3[-{(To-Tr)+C}] , 
 
(12) E[O] = P1[-{To+I}] + P2[-(To+I)] . 
 
Imposing the choice criterion to choose R iff E[R] $ E[O] and expressed in terms of the probability of a 
bluff, this implies that relief is optimally chosen when the probability of a bluff is below a given level: 
 
(13) P3 # P2 [(To+I)/(To ! Tr)] ! C/(To ! Tr) . 
 
The general decision rule under imperfect information can be illustrated by a graph of this equation 
in three dimensional space, where the dimensions are the probabilities (P1, P2, P3); Figure 3.  The rule is 
defined by a plane that is parallel to the P1 axis, as indicated by the independence of the rule from the 
probability P1 in condition 13.  If copy cat costs are zero, this plane contains the P1 
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axis.  This clearly shows that the lower copy cat costs are, the larger the opportunity to successfully offer 
relief.  
To construct the appropriate graph, combine the decision rule with the restrictions that guarantee 
proper probabilities, namely that the events are mutually exclusive, exhaustive and on the surface of the 
unit simplex.  Analytically, this is defined by (P1+P2+P3) = 1  and 0 # P1, P2, P3 # 1. 
These three relationships delineate a portion of the face of the pyramidal space in three dimensions, 
given the is an intersection of the two planes.  The analytical solution for the three points A1, A2, A3 are 
derived in the mathematical appendix.  These points can be combined with the constraints on the 
probabilities to determine extreme values for an intersection to exist. If an intersection does not exist then 
there is no set of subject probabilities under which relief is the dominant strategy and any such threat 
should be denied.  The existence of an intersection depends on the relative magnitudes of C, T0, Tr and I, 
as we show below.   
      
(14) P2 = (To-Tr+C)/(To+I)   (=1) 
 
The equation defines the coordinate along the P2 axis.  Similar calculations are done to solve for the 
coordinate along the P3 axis.  Taken together and imposing 0 # P2, P3 # 1, implies: 
 
(15) !(To ! Tr)  #  C  # Tr + I . 
 
The first inequality says that copy cat costs are not below than the negative of the level of relief 
demanded.  However, this constraint is non-binding since copy cat gains are irrational behavior.  
Common sense says that copy cat costs cannot be net gain for the local government, firms will not 
voluntarily offer to pay higher taxes, ceteris paribus.  The second inequality is the basic rule: if copy cat 
costs exceed direct and indirect revenues related to the threatening firm, do not offer relief.   
Since the decision rule (13) is independent of P1 it is illustrative to examine the rule in the (P2, P3) 
plane.  Figure 4 graphs the two operative constraints: (13) and (P2+P3=1).  The shaded area indicates the 
subjective probability values under which relief is the dominant strategy for the local government.  The 
maximum value of P3 under which relief is dominant is defined by the ordinate A3, the following ordered 
pair. 
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Figure 4.  Delineating the “relief dominant” probabilities 
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The presence of negative C in the numerator of the ordinate clearly shows that the larger are copy cat 
costs, the less likely a government would be to entertain a bluff.  (Recall that P3 is the probability of a 
bluff.)  A decrease in copy cat costs causes a parallel shift up in the line defined by (13).  This causes an 
increase in both the maximum value of P3 and the area where relief is dominant. ceteris paribus.   
We present (16) in terms of (To ! Tr) to highlight the role of the magnitude of relief demanded.  How 
the governments optimal decision rule varies with changes in the elements of our model are presented in 
the mathematical appendix.  The level of relief affects both the slope and intercept of the line defining the 
relief-dominant area, (13), in figure 4.  An intersection of the two constraints implies the following 
condition holds: 
 
equivalently: 
This says that dominance of relief depends on copy cat costs being less that the initial value of the 
firm.  If copy cat costs exceed the original value of the firm such requests for tax relief should be denied, 
even if the firm might relocate. 
An increase in the level of relief demanded decreases the area where relief is optimal.  Intuitively, the 
smaller the relief package demanded the easier it is for the government to offer it.  Nevertheless, as the 
comparative static derivatives (see Appendix B) show, a low level of relief does not mean a government 
should be more willing to entertain a bluff.  The effect of an increase in (T0-Tr) on the ordinate, P3, is 
ambiguous.  The bottom line is that the dominance of relief, when a bluff is possible, will always depend 
on copy cat costs.    
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To retain firms, states are forgiving billions of dollars of tax liabilities (Bartik 1994).  Some firms 
move anyway.  Other firms obtain tax concessions by bluffing (Des Moines Register 1995).  And when 
one firm in a jurisdiction gets a tax break, the other firms justifiably demand similar treatment.  Tax 
incentive packages can cost much more than the reduced tax revenues from the single threatening firm. 
    We presented an analysis of the tax game between a local government and a firm in an 
asymmetric/imperfect information context.   We demonstrated the importance of the probability of a bluff 
and the role of copy cat costs in the criteria for determining a government's dominant strategy.  To 
focus on bluffs and copy cat costs we abstracted from two very important related issues.  One is whether 
or not taxes matter in firm location choice in the short run.  Local taxes add to location-specific costs and 
thus differentiate locations.  The relatively higher tax locations should be less attractive, all else equal.  
All else is simply not equal.  High taxes are often associated with high public good provision, productive 
amenities, and a highly educated workforce.  This makes high tax locations more attractive.  Furthermore, 
taxes are a small part of a firm's total costs.  Other location-specific costs and characteristics are usually 
much more significant.  Thus, empirical evidence that relative tax rates matter is mixed (see Charney 
1983; Bartik 1985 and 1992; Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987; Smith and Fox 1990). 
  Thus, the probability that the place which imposes the lower tax liability gets the firm is not really 
equal to one.  An explicit consideration of stochastic firm relocation behavior would require a much more 
complex model.  In general, a doubt that a threatening firm will not simply locate where the tax liability is 
lowest scales expected payoffs in retention cases by the probability that the firm indeed could be retained.  
This adjustment would ambiguously affect the difference between the expected payoff to the government 
of the relief strategy relative to the original tax package strategy. 
The second important issue is whether or not risking the budget is worthwhile in the long run.  
Again, empirical evidence is mixed.  Lower tax revenues and/or higher spending on incentives mean less 
revenue available for public good provision.  The costs of public good and service provision may exceed 
the locality's reduced fiscal capacity (e.g., Smith and Fox 1990).  This can also undermine their ability to 
attract and retain firms in the long run (Isserman 1994).  Localities that benefit from taking the risk 
probably have other characteristics that allow them to capture agglomeration economies, or to attract 
population by attracting and retaining employers, as shown by Wassmer (1994).  On the other hand, if 
incentives include infrastructure investment, training, or other "self-help" activities, these outlays pay off 
in the long run regardless of whether or not a threatening firm was retained by them (Goss and Phillips 
1994). 
This paper provides a basic testable model of  local government behavior in the midst of a 'tax war'.  
The model to test is whether or not local governments do in fact offer relief when after-relief direct and 
indirect tax revenues related to the firm  (Tr + I) at least cover copy cat costs (C).  This model can be 
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posed as a discrete choice problem in which relief is a (0,1) dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables include relief tax levels and copy cat costs.  The hypothesis that governments behave as we 
model would be supported by negative coefficients on level of relief, (To - Tr) and copy cat costs, C.   
Our exact model cannot be tested explicitly since one of the arguments in the choice criterion is not 
observable.  The arguments Tr and C (direct tax revenues and copy cat costs) are observable or at least 
estimable.  However, the indirect tax revenues (I) due to the activity of the firm in the jurisdiction are 
typically estimated assuming that all revenues generated in a region is received and spent there.  
Particularly in rural areas this assumption is not true.  In lieu of the this problem we can instrument the 
choice criterion (4) or the RHS of (15) by considering it in ratio form: 
 
Consider the following scenario:  A firm that employees a large portion of the labor force in a locality 
threatens to relocate for a better tax package.  If it is a major employer, it provides relatively large indirect 
revenues and there are few firms to behave as copy cats, so C is likely small relative to the indirect 
revenues (I).  The relief tax revenues reinforce the relative magnitudes in the inequality.  Thus the ration 
in (17) is very likely less than unity and relief is likely the dominant strategy for the local government.  In 
contrast, if a relatively small employer threatens, copy cat costs relative to direct and indirect revenues 
can exceed unity, and this firm's request for tax relief should be denied.  This suggest that the threatening 
firm's portion of local employment as well as the tax rate of relief demanded would be relevant 
explanatory variables in a model predicting the probability that relief is offered.  These are intuitively 
satisfying instruments, given the preponderance of reports of successful threats by relatively large firms.  
We can verify that in addition to being less newsworthy, "small firm" relief is less likely to be dominant 
as well.  
Finally, state governments could use some help determining the probabilities that rank their tax 
burdens relative to others.  Our analysis suggests that an estimate of the amount of money states would be 
willing to pay to avoid responding to a bluff is given by copy cat costs.  This is some percentage of their 
current tax base.  States could pool these (or far lesser) resources to finance the operation of an 
information clearinghouse that could generate Arelocation threat credibility profiles@ for firms by type and 
location. 
Further research and empirical testing is warranted.  If a government calls a firm's bluff and the firm 
stays, tax revenues would be secured and public services for the community would be provided.  
1 _ 
I + T
C
r
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However, if the local government conceded when copy cat costs were large they may not be able to 
provide necessary public services.  Local governments need to become more informed about the other 
jurisdictions they are competing with.  As local governments become more informed about the other 
government's tax offers it is less likely that they will needlessly offer a relief package. 
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Mathematical Appendix 
 
 
Analytical solutions for points A1, A2, A3 in figure 3.  The unit simplex generalizes two of the 
special cases examined here.   
 
Point A1 = (0 , P2 , 0 ) :  This point below the unit simplex.  Therefore, the probabilities are not 
required to sum to one.   
 
 Given  
  
P
P
1
3
0
0
=
=   
 and equation (13)  
   P P
T I
T T
C
T T
r
r r
3 2
0 0
= +−



 − −  
 
  P
C
T T
T T
T I
C
T Ir
r
r r
2
0
0= −




−
+



 = +  
 
Therefore,  
  A
C
T Ir
1 0 0= +



, ,   
 
 # 
 
Point A2 = ( 0 , P2 , P3 )  :  Point A2 is our case 2 : “It Depends”.   
 
 Given  
   
  P1 0=  ,    
  
 the unit simplex 
   
  P P P1 2 3 1+ + =  
 
 and equation (13) 
   
  P P
T I
T T
C
T T
r
r r
3 2
0 0
= +−



 − − .   
 
 By substitution    
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  ( )1 2 2
0 0
− = +−



 − −P P
T I
T T
C
T T
r
r r
 
 
  P
T I
T T
C
T T
r
r r
2
0 0
1 1− − +−



 =
−
− −  
  
   P
T T C
T I
r
2
0
0
= − ++



  
 finally,   
  P P
T T C
T I
T I C
T I
r r
3 2
0
0 0
1 1= − = − − ++



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+ −
+



  
 Therefore, 
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T T C
T I
T I C
T I
r r
2
0
0 0
0= − ++
+ −
+



, ,   
 
 # 
 
Comparative Static Analysis with P1 = 0.  
 
A P P
T T C
T I
T I C
T I
r r
2 2 3
0
0 0
= = − ++
+ −
+



( , ) ,  
  
 
∂
∂
P
C T Io
2 1 0= + >  
 
 
∂
∂
P
C T Io
3 1 0= − + <  
  
 # 
 
 
Point A3 = (P1 , P2 , 0 ):  Notice that this is our Case 3, “No  Bluff”.  The point A3 obtained by 
solving the following equations :  
  Given  
  P3 0= , 
 the unit simplex  
  
  P P P1 2 3 1+ + =  
 
 and equation (13)  
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  P P
T I
T T
C
T T
r
r r
3 2
0 0
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


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 By substitution,  
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T T
P
T I
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

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 Solving for P1,  
  P
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T I
T I C
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r
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+ −
+    
 
 And solving for P2 
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Comparative static analysis of the area of the triangle in Figure 4. 
 Area = (1/2)bh = − +
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 sign
Area
C
sign T I T I Co r
∂
∂



 = − + + + +( ( ) )2  
 
Assuming an intersection exists, we can utilize the following inequality. 
 
C
T I
C T I
r
r+ ≤ ⇒ ≤ +1       
 
 Then  
  
 ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )− + + + + ≤ − + + + + + = − <T I T I C T I T I T I T To r o r r r o2 2 0 
 
 Therefore,  
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 APPENDIX B.  RELEVANT NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
 
1. Des Moines Register,  January 20, 1994 
2. Des Moines Register, April 23, 1995 
3. Washington Post Weekly August 28-,1995 
4. Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1995 
5. Des Moines Register, January 30, 1994 
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